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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE
The Respondents obtained over 200 acres of real property in Franklin County Idaho in

2002. Respondent Gordon Jones operated a construction company doing business in both Idaho
and Utah. In 2004, Respondent Gordon Jones commenced a lawsuit in Utah to collect from
Appellant monies owed for the construction of a horne.
In the subsequent Utah state court proceedings, a judgment was entered against
Respondent Gordon Jones individually and in favor of Appellant. Prior to the entering of the
judgment in Utah, the Respondents transfened away the above described real property to
Respondent J&J Livestock, LLC.
Appellant filed the Utah state court judgment in the Idaho District COUli of Franklin
County as a foreign judgment pursuant to I.C. § 10-1110.

This foreign judgment was also

recorded in Franklin County to create a lien on the real property pursuant to I.e. § 10-1110.
Thereafter, Appellant filed a lawsuit against the Respondents to undo the transfer of the real
property alleging that the transfer was fraudulent.
The case was delayed for many reasons.

During this time Respondent Linda Jones

passed away, requiring her estate to become a party in these proceedings. Additionally, in 2010,
District Judge David C. Nye dismissed Respondent Jason Jones from the litigation. More than
five years after the foreign judgment was filed by the Appellant, and the Appellant filed its
fraudulent conveyance case, the matter was scheduled for trial by Judge Nye. Judge Nye and the
parties all agreed that none of the facts were in dispute and that the matter could be resolved by

jointly filed motions for summary judgment rather than by holding an evidentiary trial. The
parties submitted their initial briefs, responses and replies, all of which Judge Nye took under
advisement.
On April 1, 2011, Judge Nye issued his Decision on Motions for Summary Judgment
concluding that Appellant's judgment and judgment lien had lapsed because the Appellant had
failed to renew his judgment or judgment lien within 5 years as required by I.C. § 10-1111.
Judge Nye also concluded that Appellant had failed to seek any writs within the time provided by
Idaho law as required by I.C. §§ 11-101 and 105. As a result, Judge Nye entered his Decision on
Motion for Summary Judgment and granted judgment in favor of Respondents and against the
Appellant. The Appellant now appeals.

II.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On November 8, 2002, Respondents Gordon & Linda Jones received real propeliy in

Franklin County, Idaho by wananty deed consisting of an excess of 200 acres (hereafter the
"Franklin Property").

The warranty deed was recorded on November 12, 2002, as Franklin

County Recorder's Instrument No. 219428. 1

1 R.

at 331-32, paragraph 17.

4

Respondent Gordon Jones initiated litigation in Utah to collect from the Appellant
monies Respondent Gordon Jones believed were due and owing for building Appellant a home.
This case was designated as Utah state court, Davis County Case No. 020700570. 2
Appellant countersued and on December 15, 2004, the Judge in the Utah case scheduled a
trial in the matter for April 26-29, 2005. 3
On December 22, 2004, Respondents transferred the Franklin Propeliy by quitclaim deed
to Respondent J&J Livestock, LLC. Said quitclaim deed was recorded on December 27, 2004,
as Franklin County Recorder's Instrument No. 228503. 4 Respondent J&J Livestock, LLC was
formed by Respondents in the state of Utah on December 28, 2004. 5 On March 7, 2005,
Respondents also transferred water shares that are appUlienant to the Franklin Property to
Respondents Linda Jones and Jason Jones. 6
The Utah, Davis County case went to trial. Utah District COUli Judge Michael G. Allphin
dismissed the claims brought by Respondent Gordon Jones and on April 29, 2005, declared his
intention to award judgment in favor of Appellant and against Respondent Gordon Jones. 7

2

R. at 332, paragraphs 18-19.

R. at 332-33, paragraph 21.
R. at 345-46.
5 R. at 333, paragraph 23.
6 R. at 333, paragraph 24.
7 R. at 333, paragraph 26.

3

4

5

On May 11, 2005, Appellant filed his complaint in this action commencing the present
case in an effort to undo what he claimed were fraudulent transfers involving the Franklin
County property.s
A document, purporting to be a judgment was entered by Judge Allphin in the Utah,
Davis County case on July 7, 2005, against Respondent Gordon Jones individually in the amount
of $1 ,886,727.87. 9
On July 15, 2005, the Respondents transferred the Franklin Property by quitclaim deed
from Respondent J&J Livestock LLC back to the Respondents Gordon & Linda Jones
individually. Said quitclaim deed was recorded on July 29,2005, as Franklin County Recorder's
Instrument No. 230638.]0
On August 1,2005, pursuant to I.C. § 10-1110, Appellant chose to file a Notice of Filing
ForeignJudgment, and the Affidavit of Margaret H. Olson re: Foreign Judgment in the present
litigation. I I By doing do, Appellant filed in Franklin County Idaho, as a foreign judgment, the
Utah, Davis County judgment described above.
On September 23, 2005, Appellant also chose to record its Notice of Filing Foreign
Judgment as Franklin County Recorder's Instrument No. 231394.

12

Appellant also recorded the

document issued by Judge Allphin in the Utah state comi proceedings purpOliing to be a

R. at 1-10.
R. at 347-51.
10 R. at 561.
II R. at 334, paragraph 31; R. at 369-74.
12 R. at 369-70.

8

9

6

Judgment in the sum of $1,886,727.87.

Said document was recorded as Franklin County

Recorder's Instrument No. 231395.13
By reason of having recorded the documents described above, Appellant affirmatively
declared that he had obtained a judgment "lien" against the Respondents' Franklin Property on
September 23, 2005. 14 Appellant maintained this position in his Settlement Agreement with the
Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee described below. IS
On April 18, 2006, Respondent Gordon Jones individually filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy
in Utah. On January 31, 2007, the Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee and Appellant entered in a
Settlement Agreement concerning among other things Appellant's litigation in Idaho against
Respondent Gordon Jones for the alleged fraudulent transfers. 16
The Settlement Agreement states in pertinent part:
The Trustee stipulates and agrees that [Appellant] has a valid, enforceable security
interest in the [therein described] propeliy of [Respondent Gordon Jones'] bankruptcy
[including the Franklin Propeliy]. .. , Upon the Effective Date of the Agreement, ...
any and all property of the [Respondent Gordon Jones'] bankruptcy estate of any kind
whatsoever, known or unknown, tangible and intangible, including, but not limited to real
property ... personal property ... causes of action ... [including] the Idaho Fraudulent
Transfer Action . . . shall be deemed abandoned and no longer property of the
[Respondent Gordon Jones'] bankruptcy estate and [Appellant] shall be deemed to have
relief from the stay to pursue any and all state comi remedies against the [Respondent
Gordon Jones] and such propeliy. 17

R.
R.
15 R.
16 R.
17 R.
13

14

at 371-74.
at 334, paragraph 31.
at 400, paragraph H.
at 335, paragraphs 35-37; R. at 381-414.
at 404, paragraph 4.

7

The Settlement Agreement further states that Appellant is entitled to fully pursue all his rights
and claims against the aforesaid property, which rights and claims are not altered, amended or
affected in any way by this Agreement or by the filing of the Respondent Gordon Jones'
bankruptcy case.
Gordon Jones.

Further, the Settlement Agreement states that it is binding on Respondent

18

The Settlement Agreement was approved by the Bankruptcy Court in an Order dated
April 19,2007. 19
On January 20, 2009, Bankruptcy Judge Judith A. Boulden issued an Order granting a
discharge of all of Respondent Gordon Jones' unsecured debt.

This Order of Discharge

"prohibits any attempt to collect from [Respondent Gordon Jones] a debt that has been
discharged. . ..

However, a creditor may have the right to enforce a valid lien such as a

mortgage or security interest, against the debtor's propeliy after bankruptcy, if that lien was not
avoided or eliminated in the bankruptcy case. 20
The judgment lien that Appellant affill11atively declared that he had obtained against the
Franklin Propeliy on September 23, 2005, was not avoided in the bankruptcy case. Additionally,
the filing of the Notice of Foreign Judgment in Idaho by Appellant was not avoided in the
bankruptcy case. 21

R.
R.
20 R.
II
- R.
18

19

at 335-36, paragraphs 38-40; R. at
at 414-25.
at 336, paragraphs 41-44; R. at 414-25.
at 336, paragraph 45.

8

On February 23,2011, District Judge David C. Nye took the case under advisement, upon
the receipt of the summary judgment briefs, responses and replies from Appellant and
Respondents.

22

At no time during the pendency of these proceedings did Appellant ever take any

action or file any motion of any sort with this Court or any COllli in Idaho to renew his Foreign
Judgment or to renew his judgment lien in any way as required by I.C. § 10-1111. 23
Further, Appellant never filed any motion of any sort with this Court or any court in
Idaho to seek execution on the Foreign Judgment or the judgment lien he declared to have
obtained as required by I.C. §§ 11-101 and 105?4
More than five (5) years passed since Appellant filed his Foreign Judgment in Franklin
County Idaho.

Additionally, more than five (5) years passes since Appellant recorded the

document issued by Judge Allphin in the Utah state cOUli proceedings purpOliing to create his
judgment lien in the sum of $1,886,727.87. Said documents were recorded as Franklin County
Recorder's Instrument No. 231394 and 231395 respectively on September 23,2005. 25
All of the causes of action in Appellant's Second Amended Complaint are dependent
upon the existence and validity of the Foreign Judgment and judge lien Appellant declared to
have obtained?6

22 R. at 653-655.
23 Record before the Court is devoid of any such motions or requests.
24 Record before the COUli is devoid of any such motions or requests.
25 R. at 334, paragraph 31; R. at 348-35l.
26 R. at 329-44.

9

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
It appears that the following issues have been identified and/or argued by the Appellant in

his Appellants' Brief:
1.

Whether the district comi properly granted Respondent's motion for summary
judgment upon deciding that Appellant's foreign judgment and judgment lien had
lapsed?

2.

Whether the district court properly denied the Appellant's motion for summary
judgment upon deciding that Appellant had failed to seek a timely writ of
execution?

3.

Whether the district court properly dismissed Respondent Jason Jones as a party
from these proceedings?

In addition, Respondents identify the following issue on appeal: Whether Respondents
are entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal?

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Respondents are entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to I.C.

§ 12-121, LR.C.P. 54(e)(1), and I.A.R. 11.2. The Appellant's pursuit of this appeal must be
deemed umeasonable, frivolous, without merit, not well grounded, not walTanted by existing
law, and not made in good faith.
The evidence relied upon by the district comi below was undisputed, uncontroverted and
derived primarily from the Appellant's own pleadings, namely the Appellant's Second Amended

10

Complaint and the exhibits attached thereto.

The Appellant failed to present any evidence

sufficient to create any genuine issues of material fact. The Appellant ignored the clear law
regarding judgments and judgment liens in Idaho and the proper methods in which said
judgments and judgment lines are renewed. Rather, Appellant simply seeks to have this COUli
ignore the applicable law and allow him to still proceed on his lapsed judgment and lapsed
judgment lien.
For these reasons and upon these grounds, Respondents respectfully requests attomey
fees and costs on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12-121, LR.C.P. 54(e)(I), and LA.R. 11.2.

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND ARGUMENT
I.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary Judgment is appropriate when " ... the pleadings, depositions, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving patiy is entitled to Judgment as a matter of law." State v. Rubbermaid,
129 Idaho 353 (1996) citing to McCoy v. Lions, 120 Idaho 765, 769 (1991).
Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue, the burden shifts to the
nonmoving party to make a showing of the existence of a genuine issue of material fact on the
elements challenged by the moving patiy. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527,
530-31,887 P.2d 1034, 1037-38 (1994). It is well settled in Idaho that in order to create a
genuine issue of material fact, the patiy opposing the motion must present more than just a
conclusory assertions that at1 issue of material fact exists. Van Velson Corp. v. Westwood .Mall

11

Assoc., 126 Idaho 401, 406, 884 P.2d 414,419, (1994). "Rather, the [opposing party] must
respond to the summary judgment motion with specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial." Tuttle v. Sudenga Indus., Inc., 125 Idaho 145, 150,868 P.2d 473, 478 (1994).
The non-moving party has the obligation of establishing the existence of each element
essential to any claims they have made in which they bear the burden of proof at trial. This
obligation has been imposed by the United States Supreme Court in applying Rule 56(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the case of Cellotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
The Idaho Supreme Court has adopted Cellotex in the application of Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure 56(c). See, Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101,102 (1998). In Cellotex, Justice Renquist
wrote for the majority and explained:
The plain language of Rule 5 6( c) mandates the entry of Summary Judgment, after
adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's
case, and on which that pmiy will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a
situation, there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete
failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving pmiy is entitled to a
Judgment as a matter of law ... 477 U.S. at 322-323.
As a result of Cello/ex, the Appellant in this case cannot raise merit-less claims to defeat
Summary Judgment. Rather the Appellant must introduce or point to facts in the record that
support each element of each claim asselied in Appellant's Second Amended Complaint.
The facts of the present case are admitted to by the Appellant in his Second Amended
Complaint.

By application of Idaho law, namely I.e. § 10-1111, the Appellant's foreign

judgment and judgment lien lapsed and can no longer be pursued by Appellant. Additionally,

12

even if the foreign judgment and judgment lien were still somehow valid, Appellant has entirely
failed to timely execute on the foreign judgment he declared to have obtained pursuant to 1. C. §§
11-101 and 105. For these reasons, all of Appellant's claims in his Second Amended Complaint
fail, there are no remaining valid causes of action for Appellant to pursue, and the dismissal
Appellant's Second Amended Complaint and this litigation by the district court was proper.

II.

APPELLANT'S FOREIGN JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT LIEN LAPSED
Both the foreign judgment and the judgment lien Appellant declared that he obtained,

lapsed by operation of Idaho law. Once it has been correctly filed a foreign judgment becomes
enforceable as an Idaho judgment as of the date of filing pursuant to I.C. § 10-1302. G&R

Petroleum, Inc., v. Clements, 127 Idaho 119, 120,898 P.2d 50,51 (1995). Upon recording, such
a judgment becomes a lien upon real property. West mark Federal Credit Union v. Smith, 116
Idaho 474, 476, 776 P.2d 1193, 1195 (1989).
A judgment lien is purely a creature of statute and does not exist in the body of our
common law. Messenger v. Burns, 86 Idaho 26,29,383 P.2d 913,914 (1963). A judgment lien
is created in Idaho by recording a judgment with the county recorder. I.C. § 10-1110. "The lien
resulting from recording of a judgment other than for SUppOli of a child continues five (5) years
from the date of the judgment." I.C. § 10-1110. At any time prior to the expiration of the lien
created by I.C. § 10-1110, the coilli which entered the judgment, may upon motion, renew such
judgment. I.C. § 10-1111 (Italics added). The renewed judgment may be recorded in the same

13

manner as the original judgment, and the lien established thereby shall continue for five (5)
years. Id.
Idaho courts "view I. C. § 10-1111 to be in the nature of a statute of limitations; it sets the
time limit for a judgment creditor to take action to renew the judgment and its judgment lien."
Smith v. Smith, 131 Idaho 800, 802, 964 P.2d 667, 669 (Ct. App. 1998). If no motion is filed by

the judgment creditor within the time prescribed then both the judgment and the judgment lien
lapse or expire. G&R Petroleum" 127 Idaho at 121, 898 P.2d at 52. Even if a motion is properly
filed and the judgment is renewed there is a clear statutory mandate that, in order for a renewed
judgment lien to be acquired and perfected, the renewed judgment itself must be recorded.
I.C. § 10-1111. A lien simply does not exist if the judgment, or renewed judgment, has not been
recorded. Amato v. The United States of America, et aI, 94 F. Supp.2d 1077, 1081 (D. Idaho).
This reasoning is supported by longstanding Idaho case law which holds, "that a judgment lien
lapses under the statute creating it, at the expiration of five years from the date it is docketed."
Id., (citing, Platts v. Pac(fic First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n o.fTacoma, 62 Idaho 340, 343,

111 P.2d 1093, 1096 (1941)).
The facts in the present case are not in dispute and were correctly considered by the
district cOUli. Appellant pleaded these facts in his Second Amended Complaint and the Exhibits

14

attached thereto and he

IS

bound by his own admissions and declarations concerning these

facts. 27
The undisputed facts before this Court are that on August 1, 2005, Appellant filed a
Notice of Filing Foreign Judgment in the present litigation and recorded it on September 23,
2005 as Franklin County Recorder's Instrument No. 231394. 28 On this same date Appellant also
recorded the document issued by Judge Allphin in the Utah state comi proceedings purp01iing to
be a Judgment in the sum of $1,886,727.87 as Franklin County Recorder's Instrument
No.231395?9 By reason of having recorded the documents attached to his Second Amended
Complaint as Exhibit "E", Appellant affirmatively declares that he obtained a judgment lien
against the Franklin Property on September 23, 2005. 30
Appellant failed to file a motion with this Court, within five years of August 1, 2005 to
renew the Foreign Judgment he claims to have obtained. 3 ! Therefore, on August 1, 2010, this
judgment lapsed by operation of Idaho law and no longer exists. 32 Appellant also failed to renew
his recorded judgment within five years of September 23, 2005. As a result, on September 23,

27 R. at 329-428. Appellant's Second Amended Complaint with all attached Exhibits.
28 R. at 334, paragraph 31; R. at 369-74.
29 R. at 334, paragraph 31; R. at 348-51.
30 R. at 334, paragraph 31; R. at 400, paragraph H.
31 R. at 562-65; State Court Docket is devoid of any "motion" filed at any time by Appellant to
renew the Foreign Judgment he declared to have obtained.
32 I.C. § 10-1111.

15

2010, Appellant's judgment lien also lapsed and is no longer a valid lien on the Respondents'
property by operation of Idaho law. 33
As Appellant has admitted in its Second Amended Complaint, due to the Order of
Discharge entered in Defendant Gordon Jones's bankruptcy proceedings, Appellant is only
entitled to pursue valid and enforceable security interests which would not have been discharged
by the bankruptcy.34 Because Appellant no longer holds a valid judgment lien in Idaho the
bankruptcy Order of Discharge by its own terms prevents Appellant from obtaining or seeking a
new one now. 35
In summary, based upon the record created by Appellant's Second Amended Complaint,
and all the documents attached thereto, any valid foreign judgment and judgment lien that
Appellant may have enjoyed in Idaho have now lapsed. For these reasons, this Court should
uphold the decision of the district court in granting summary judgment in favor of Respondents.
In an effort to persuade this Court that the district court's decision was somehow in en'or,
Appellant raises several new arguments in his Appellant's Brief that the Respondents will
address. First, Appellant's appear to claim that the district court's reliance on I.e. § 10-1111 was
"misplaced" because the 5-year deadline was somehow "tolled." However, Appellant provides
no statutory or case law authority supporting this conclusory statement that the 5-year period can

33 I.C. § 10-1111.
34 R. at 335-36, paragraphs 35-45.
r
) R. at 336, paragraph 43-44; R. at 427-28.

16

be tolled. There is no authority that applies "tolling" to I.C. §§ 10-1110 or 10-1111. Thus no
tolling can or did occur in the present case and the Court should disregard this argument.
Appellant attempted to raise different tolling arguments concerning I.C. § 10-111 0 in his
summary judgment brief based on I.C. § 5-234 and/or the bankruptcy filed by Respondent
Gordon Jones. 36 Respondents provided the applicable Idaho and bankruptcy law showing that no
tolling occurred. 37 In his Decision on Motions for Summary Judgment, Judge Nye correctly
analyzed the applicable law and found that the five year deadline of I. C. § 10-1110 was not
tolled. 38
Next, the Appellant appears to claim that the Respondents' affirnlative defenses assert
"inconsistent positions" that somehow estop the Respondents from relying upon the argument
that the judgment and lien both lapsed. However, I.R.C.P. 8(e)(2).provides:
"A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alternatively
or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate counts or defenses .
. . . A party may also state as many separate claims or defenses as the paIiy has
regmdless of consistency and whether based on legal or on equitable grounds or
on both .... "
Based upon this authority, the affirmative defenses raised by the Respondent were proper.
Additionally, the district court properly analyzed the issue of whether the Appellant's judgment
and lien lapsed pursuant to I.C. §§ 10-1110 and 10-1111. For these reasons, this Court should
disregard this argument as well.

R. at 702-04.
R. at 666-71.
38 R. 772-74.
36
37

17

The Appellant next seems to argue that it was the fault of the Respondents and "their
counsel" that he did not seek to renew his judgment and lien in time. The Appellant then claims
that the Respondents sought several continuances, filed motions, etc, during this litigation.
According to the Appellant, the Respondents "should not be allowed to benefit from their own
efforts to delay this matter" even though "Defendants' counsel's conduct in this case is not
particularly reprehensible." This argument lacks merit. Appellant could have at any time during
this litigation simply filed a motion to renew his judgment. Once the jUdgment was renewed he
could then have recorded the renewed judgment. Respondents did nothing, and in fact, could do
nothing to stop Appellant from renewing his judgment and lien at any time before they lapsed.
This argument has no suppOli from the record and should be disregarded by this Court.
The next argument Appellant makes is that even if the lien lapsed, the judgment did not
and Appellant should still now be able to pursue his judgment through its cOUli action, which
was filed before the judgment lapsed. Appellant raised this argument previously in its summary
judgment motion to Judge Nye. 39 This argument is nonsensical for two reasons. First, both the
renewal of the judgment and the lien are controlled by I.C. § 10-1111. If the judgment lapsed the
lien had to have lapsed as well. The lien cannot continue or survive without the judgment.
Second, the Appellant has already admitted tlu'ough its pleadings that because of the bankruptcy
it can only pursue a "valid lien.,,40 So even if the Appellant were correct and only the lien

R. at 698-701.
40 R. at 336, paragraphs 41-44.
39

18

lapsed, it still cannot pursue the judgment alone now due to the bankruptcy comi's Discharge
Order. 4 1 Thus the claim that Appellant makes under LC. § 5-215 can only be applicable where
no intervening banhuptcy occUlTed. However, since an intervening bankruptcy exists in this
case, and Appellant holds no valid lien, Appellant can no longer seek to recover under the Utah
state court judgment in any way, including bringing or maintaining an "action on the judgment."
Thus this Court should disregard this argument since the record evidences both the lapse of the
lien and the intervening bankruptcy.
The next argument Appellant makes is similar. Appellant claims that a judgment creditor
holding a foreign judgment can choose between filing a formal action on that judgment or simply
filing the judgment under the Uniform Foreign Judgment Act as an independent judgment.
This legal position is not disputed by Respondents. However, Respondents do dispute the claim
made by the Appellant that it chose to file a formal action on the judgment. Respondents also
dispute Appellant's claim that its Second Amended Complaint contains a claim on the Utah state
court judgment. The facts of this case do not allow Appellant to rely upon this legal position.
The record clearly shows that Appellant chose to file under the Uniform Foreign Judgment Act. 42
The record also evidences that Appellant's Second Amended Complaint never asserts a claim on
the Utah state COllli judgment. Rather, it states on its face, and in its allegations and causes of

41

42

R. at 336, paragraphs 43-44; R. at 427-28.
R. at 334, paragraph 31; R. at 369-74.

19

action that it was "an action under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.,,43

There is no

allegation, claim or cause of action for a judgment on the Utah state court judgment.

The

Appellant simply wanted to undo a transfer of real property so that its foreign judgment and lien
could be pursued. Further, as argued above, even if the Appellant did make such a claim, once
the lien lapsed, the intervening bankruptcy would stop Appellant from pursuing the action.
Additionally, applicable Idaho law limits a paliy in their choice of action on a Foreign Judgment.
The paliy can either file a foreign judgment or they can file an action on a judgment, but they
cannot do both at the same time.
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For these reasons, this argument is not supported by the

record or applicable law and should be disregarded by this Court.

III.

FAILURE TO PROCEED WITH EXECUTION
In addition to failing to renew his Foreign Judgment and judgment lien Appellant also

failed to proceed with a timely execution. Execution upon a judgment in Idaho is controlled by
statute. Except for child support, the paliy in whose favor judgment is given may, at any time

within five (5) years afier the entry thereof; have a writ of execution issued for its enforcement.
I.C. § 11-101 (Italics added).

Under this statute a judgment creditor may delay taking out

execution against his debtor, as long as this statute permits him to claim the issuance of
execution. Stewart v. Slater, 61 Idaho 628, 629, 105 P.2d 729 (1940). In all cases, other than

43 R. at 329-44.
44 R. at 761- 63, Respondent's Reply arguments section C. containing the applicable case law.
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for the recovery o./'money, the judgment may be enforced or carried into execution after the lapse
of five (5) years from the date of its entry, by leave of the court, upon motion, or by judgment for
that purpose, founded upon supplemental pleadings. I.C. § 11-105 (Italics added).
In the present case, the record reflects that Appellant took no action to execute upon any
such judgment within five (5) years after said judgment was entered. As established by the
record above, the Foreign Judgment Appellant relies upon was filed in Franklin County, Idaho
on August 1, 2005. In addition to allowing his Foreign Judgment and judgment lien to lapse
Appellant made no effort to file a motion or to obtain an Order from the Court allowing
execution on the judgment within five (5) years of August 1,2005. Appellant only sought such a
writ in its Motion for Summary Judgment and Issuance of Writ of Execution on February 11,

2011, after he learned from Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment that he had already
missed the five (5) year deadline to obtain a writ of execution. Under applicable Idaho law, it is
too late for Appellant to obtain any writ of execution.
Appellant appears to argue that since Respondent did not "attack [] the validity of the
Utah judgment," that he can still somehow seek execution on the Utah judgment. Appellant
even seeks to have this COUli "mandate the issuance of a Writ of Execution by the court below."
In doing so, Appellant completely ignores the applicable law set f01ih above.

Additionally,

Appellant ignores the application of the law causing his Foreign Judgment and jUdgment lien to
lapse. It appears that Appellant is arguing that a writ of execution should be issued not on any
CUlTent or existing Idaho judgment but on a judgment that mayor may not still be valid in the
state of Utah. The Appellant provides this Court with no authority for the relief it seeks because
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there is no authority for such relief. For this reason, this Court should disregard Appellant's
argument that a writ of execution should be mandated by this Court.
Appellant also appears to argue that a writ of execution should be issued because he is
not seeking "the recovery of money.,,45 This is an astounding argument for Appellant to make
given that the Utah judgment is a money jUdgment Appellant declared to have obtained in the
sum of$1,886,727.87. 46
In summary, by his own admissions, and the record before the Court Appellant has failed
to proceed with or obtain any valid execution on the judgment he claims to have. More than five
years passed and Appellant's Foreign Judgment and judgment lien lapsed. The applicable law
now prevents Appellant from obtaining nay writ of execution. For these reasons, this Court
should disregard Appellant's argument that a writ of execution should be mandated by this
Court.

IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S DISMISSAL OF JASON JONES WAS PROPER
The dismissal of Respondent Jason Jones by Judge Nye was proper and, even if it was

not, this issue is moot by reason of the lapse of the Foreign Judgment and judgment lien. The
Idaho court of Appeals has held that the relevant period of time on which the courts will focus on

45 I.e. § 11-105 provides that "In all cases other than the recovery for money, the judgment may
be enforced or canied into execution after the lapse of five (5) years from the date of its entry, by
leave of the court, upon motion, or by judgment for that purpose, founded upon supplemental
£roceedings. "
6 R. at 333-34, paragraphs 26, 31 and 32;
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in detem1ining whether there was proper service is the six months following the filling of the
complaint. Hansen v. Herrera, 137 Idaho 787, 790, 53 P.3d 838, 841 (Ct. App. 2002).
In the present case Judge Nye analyzed LR.C.P. 4(a)(2) and found that Respondent Jason
Jones was not served within six months of the filing of Appellant's First Amended Complaint,
where Respondent Jason Jones was first named as a party in this litigation. 47 Judge Nye also
found that there was no good cause shown by Appellant as to why he failed to serve Respondent
Jason Jones in a timely fashion. 48 As a result, Judge Nye dismissed Respondent Jason Jones

. 49
· 1"ItIgatlOn.
fTom t hIS
The district court's analysis and decision are supported by applicable law. Additionally,
even if the district court had been in error, the Appellant's Foreign Judgment and judgment lien
have lapsed. Because of this there are no valid causes of action remaining in the Appellant's
Second Amended Complaint that can be raised against any of the Respondents, including
Respondent Jason Jones. For this reason, this Court should disregard Appellant's argument that
the dismissal of Respondent Jason Jones from this litigation was improper.

R. at 485.
48 R. at 485-87.
49 R. at 480-88.
47

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully requested that the district cOUli's Decision on
Motions for Summary Judgment and Decision on Motion to Dismiss in favor of the Respondents
be affirmed in their entirety and that Respondents be granted their attorney fees and costs on
appeal.
DATED this 31 st day of October, 2011.
RACINE OLSON NYE BUDGE
& BAILEY, CHARTERED

LANE V. ERICKSON, of the firm
Attorneys for Respondents
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Margaret H. Olson (ID Bar # 4680)
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